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Tenth & Eleventh Lectures 
Capital and State: Imperialism and Beyond 
 
 
Regimes of differential accumulation 
 The pendulum of breadth and depth: M&A vs stagflation 
 “Economic” anomaly or the engine of capital accumulation? 
 Regimes of differential accumulation: the spread and deepening of capital as power 
 
The current crossroads 
 Neoliberalism as a breadth regime: 1980s-2000s 
 Regime shift: reaching the envelope 
 The new global context: jurisdictional integration, China, excess capacity 
 The threat: debt deflation 
 The solution: default or inflation 
 How to trigger inflation: the oil factor 
 
Imperialism 
 The happy 1990s: from Global Village to The End of History to No Logo 
 The 2000s: the Empire strikes back 
 Why imperialism: the state-centric approach 
 Anarchy: the invisible hand of economics vs. the hidden fist of global politics 
 From superpower confrontation to the omnipotent empire 
 The resource imperative: make it plenty and cheap 
 The invasion of Iraq: “It’s All About Oil” 
 
Imperialism? 
 Accumulation = growth + price stability? 
 U.S. policy and OPEC: friends or foes? 
 Why strike at a dysfunctional cartel? 
 The Bush presidency: an “oil administration”? 
 Conspiracy theory: the neo-cons contra the oil firms 
 OPEC and the oil companies: divergence or convergence? 
 What determines the price of oil: production, “scarcity” or power? 
 
Oil and profits 
 The accumulation triangle: differential prices, differential profits and energy conflicts 
 Danger zones 
 Energy conflicts and differential accumulation: the stylized facts 
 Capital accumulation: “one factor” or the overarching architecture of power? 
 
New imperialism or new capitalism? 
 The pro-inflation coalition 
 The oil companies and OPEC: the quest for high price 
 The armament companies and the neo-cons: the Project for the New American Century and the new Pearl 
Harbour 
 Dominant capital: the need for depth 
 The victims of deflation: capital at large and the “policy makers” 
 Conspiracy theory or the state of capital? 
 Determinism or open ended history? 
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FIGURE 1 Breadth and Depth in the US and the UK 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as five-year trailing averages. The buy-to-build ratio denotes expenditures on 
mergers and acquisitions expressed as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation. Stagflation is the average of: (1) the 
standardized deviations from the average of the rate of unemployment; and (2) the standardized deviation from the average 
rate of inflation of the GDP implicit price deflator. The deviations were standardized by deducting from each year the 
arithmetic mean of the series over the whole period, then dividing the result by the same arithmetic mean. The last data 
points are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: Joseph Francis, The Buy-to-Build Indicator: New Estimates for Britain and the United States, Review of Capital 
as Power, 2013, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 63-72. (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/381/).  
 
Regimes of Differential Accumulation 
 
Period Breadth through M&A Subsequent Conflict 
1900s Monopoly WWI stagflation 
1920s Oligopoly WWII stagflation 
1960s Conglomerate Vietnam / Middle East stagflation 
1990s Global New Wars stagflation 
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FIGURE 2 The Threat of Deflation 
 
* January-April. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal of World 
Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 8, p. 292 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/). Original data are from 
Business Source Premier. 
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FIGURE 3 The Debt Load 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal of World 
Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 9, p. 295 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/). Debt data until 1951 are 
from the Bank Credit Analyst Research Group; data from 1952 onward are from the Federal Reserve Board through 
Global Insight (series code: FL894104005). GDP data until 1928 are from Global Financial Data; data from 1929 onward 
are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight afterward (series code: GDP). The last data point is 
for 2015. 
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Don’t Worry About Deflation: Soothing Statements, 2002 
 
‘Ignore the Ghost of Deflation. Apart from Japan, the world has not seen deflation for 70 years.’ 
 
Financial Times columnist Samuel Britton  
 
‘Deflation is an overblown worry.’ 
 
James Grant, editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer.  
 
‘Believe in Ghosts, Goblins, Wizards and Witches if you will, but don’t believe in deflation occurring any time 
soon.’  
 
Financial expert Adrian Douglas 
  
‘The United States is nowhere close to sliding into a pernicious deflation.’  
 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
 
‘The good news is that monetary policy never runs out of power.’  
 
Former member of the Federal Reserve Board, Angell Wayne, 
 
‘There’s a much exaggerated concern about deflation. It’s not a serious prospect. Inflation is still a much more 
serious problem than deflation. Today’s Federal Reserve is not going to repeat the mistakes of the Federal 
Reserve of the 1930s. The cure for deflation is very simple. Print Money.’  
 
Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman 
 
‘Deflation is always reversible under a fiat money system. The U.S. government has a technology called the 
printing press that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.’ 
 
Ben Bernanke, ‘Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here,’ 
 
*** 
 
Quoted from Robert Prechter, “Deflation: Once More Into the Breach,” The Elliott Wave Theorist, 
January, 2003 and from the Federal Reserve Board website.
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FIGURE 4 Inflation and the Price of Oil 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing averages. The ‘real’ price of crude oil is the dollar price 
deflated by the U.S. CPI. The last data points are September 2014 for CPI inflation and October 2014 for the ‘real’ price of 
crude oil.  
 
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Data Insight (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the average 
price of crude oil; L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI; L64@C110 for the CPI of the advanced countries). 
 
(Taken from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, February): 
72 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
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Imperialism 
 
‘Imperialism used to be the white man’s burden. This gave it a bad reputation. But imperialism doesn’t stop 
being necessary because it is politically incorrect.’ 
 
Michael Ignatieff, Professor of Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University 
 
 
‘Our goals is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial order.’ 
 
Professor Stephen Peter Rosen, Head of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University 
 
 
‘The main task of the United States in preserving its empire is ‘to prevent collusion and maintain dependence 
among the vassals, [to] keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.’ 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter 
 
 
‘For globalization to work, America can’t be afraid to act like the almighty superpower it is. . . . The hidden 
hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist . . . and the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for 
Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.’  
 
Thomas Friedman, New York Times 
 
 
‘Globalisation, the economic imperialism of capital taken to its logical conclusion, has, paradoxically, required 
a new doctrine of extraeconomic, and especially military, coercion. . . . It has, in fact, been a major strategy of 
capitalist imperialism even to create local states to act as conduits of capitalist imperatives. . . .  “Operation 
Infinite War” is apparently intended to produce something more like Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. . . . It is this 
endless possibility of war that imperial capital needs in order to sustain its hegemony over the global system of 
multiple states. . . . This does not necessarily mean that the US, as global capital’s ultimate coercive power, 
will wage war for no reason at all, just for the purpose of display.’ 
 
Ellen Meiksins Wood 
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The Invasion of Iraq 
 
‘America’s chief interest in going after Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, is doubtless to save the world from 
his actual or potential weapons of mass destruction. Another large consideration, secondary as it may be, has 
attracted less attention than it should have: the effects that would follow from the opening up of the country's 
enormous reserves of oil. . . . It might seem, then, that knocking out Mr Hussein would kill two birds with one 
stone: a dangerous dictator would be gone, and with him would go the cartel that for years has manipulated 
prices, engineered embargoes and otherwise harmed consumers.’ 
  
The Economist, Septmeber 14, 2002 
 
 
‘The first reason here is oil – the desire for greater U.S. control of Iraqi (and thus indirectly other Middle 
Eastern) oil resources. The second reason is the U.S. desire to extend the U.S. drive for global domination. 
The third and last reason on this list is the desire of many dominant leaders of the Bush administration in the 
U.S., in partnership with the Sharon government in Israel, that a conquest of Iraq become the first stage of a 
‘strategic transformation’ of the entire Middle East.’  
 
Bill Christison, formerly a top political analyst at the CIA, CounterPunch, February 8, 2003 
   
 
‘Oil appears in Washington's calculations about Iraq as a strategic rather than an economic resource: the war 
against Saddam is about guaranteeing American hegemony rather than about increasing the profits of 
Exxon. . . . As part of their grand plan for using a “liberated” Iraq as a base from which to promote democracy 
and capitalism across the Middle East, they want Baghdad to explore for new reserves, rapidly increase 
production capacity and quickly flood the world market with Iraqi oil. They know that this would lead to an 
oil price crash, driving it to $15 a barrel or less. They hope that this collapse will stimulate economic growth in 
the US and the West, finally destroy Opec . . . wreck the economies of “rogue states” (Iran, Syria, Libya), and 
create more opportunities for “regime change” and democratisation.’ 
 
Yahya Sadowski. No War for Whose Oil? Collateral Damage From An Illegal War. Le Monde 
Diplomatique, April 17, 2003. 
 
 
‘There were only two credible reasons for invading Iraq: control over oil and preservation of the dollar as the 
world's reserve currency. . . . By invading Iraq, Bush has taken over the Iraqi oil fields, and persuaded the UN 
to lift production limits imposed after the Kuwait war. Production may rise to 3m barrels a day by year end, 
about double 2002 levels. More oil should bring down Opec-led prices, and if Iraqi oil production rose to 6m 
barrels a day, Bush could even attack the Opec oil-pricing cartel.’ 
 
John Chapman. The Real Reason Bush Went to War. The Guardian, July 28, 2004 
. 
 
‘From all that can be seen, oil production in Iraq is likely to remain depressed for years, no matter how much 
more blood is shed in its pursuit. It is already evident that American military action will not lead to democracy 
in Iraq, merely to the division of the country into separate ethnic enclaves, one possibly ruled by Iranian-like 
ayatollahs; it can now also be said that we will not gain any additional petroleum supplies as a result of all this 
sacrifice and tragedy. Not only has the use of force to procure Iraqi oil failed to achieve its intended results, it 
has actually made the situation worse.’ 
 
Michael Klare. The Failed Mission to Capture Iraqi Oil. Information Clearing House, September 22. 
2005. 
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The Conventional Wisdom 
 
‘. . . If there is any agreement among the pundits, this surely must be it: the coming war on Iraq will be fought 
largely over oil. The gist of the argument is simple enough, and can be summarized as follows:  
 In order to continue growing, the world economy needs plenty of cheap oil; 
 The OPEC cartel stands in the way of that goal. For years, its members have manipulated output to keep 
prices high; 
 Now, there is finally an opportunity to change the rules of the game, perhaps even to make the oil cartel 
irrelevant; 
 The entry point is Iraq. The country, says George Bush Jr., has become a “global threat.” It supports 
terrorism, it has weapons of mass destruction, and it has a ruler unscrupulous enough to use them. In the 
age of ‘preventive strikes,’ these are sufficient reasons to invade thy neighbour; 
 Once victorious, the invading armies will install a new, more friendly leader. This ruler will adopt a new 
energy policy, hostile to OPEC and friendly to the United States and the West. And since Iraq has 11 per 
cent of the world’s crude oil reserves and the ability to pump out plenty of it, the days of high oil prices 
will soon be over. . . .’ 
From Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 2003. It's All About Oil. News From Within Vol. XIX, 
No 1, January 2003, pp. 8-11 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/38/).  
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FIGURE 5 OPEC and the Petro Core 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (with 
Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). 
Company changes are due to merger. Data are deflated by the U.S. implicit price deflator. The last data points are for 
2013. 
 
SOURCE: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 2014, Table 2.4: OPEC Members’ Values of Petroleum Exports (for OPEC’s 
petroleum exports) 
http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/current/FileZ/XL/T24.XLS. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis through Data Insight (series code: PDIGDP for the U.S. GDP 
deflator). Fortune and Compustat through WRDS (for the Petro-Core’s net profit). 
 
(Taken from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, February): 
58 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
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FIGURE 6 Differential Earnings per Share and the Relative Price of Crude Oil 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing averages. EPS denotes earnings per share and is 
calculated by dividing the stock price index by the price-earnings ratio. Differential EPS is calculated by dividing the 
EPS of the integrated oil index by the EPS of the world index. The relative price of oil is the average crude price 
deflated by the U.S. CPI. The last data points are October 2014 for the differential EPS and August 2014 for the 
relative price of oil.  
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio 
of all listed firms, respectively; OILINWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed 
integrated oil firms, respectively). IMF International Financial Statistics through Data Insight (series codes: 
L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of crude oil; L64@C111for the U.S. CPI). 
 
(Taken from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, February): 
60 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
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FIGURE 7 Oil: World Production and Price 
 
NOTE: Series are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. Last data points are May 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01B); IMF International Financial 
Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes L76AA&Z@C001 for the price of crude oil; 
L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI). 
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FIGURE 8 “Scarcity” and the Real Price of Oil 
 
* Excess consumption of crude oil is the difference between world consumption and world production, expressed as a per 
cent share of the average of world consumption and world production. 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. Consumption and production of crude oil include crude oil, tight oil, oil sands and NGLs 
(the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered separately); they exclude liquid fuels from other sources such as 
biomass and derivatives of coal and natural gas. The ‘real’ price of crude oil is the dollar price deflated by the U.S. CPI. 
The last data points are for 2013 
 
SOURCE: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, April 2014 and earlier issues (for oil consumption and production). IMF 
International Financial Statistics through Data Insight (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of crude oil; 
L64@C111for the U.S. CPI). 
 
(Taken from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, February): 
52 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
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The New Wars: The Stylized Facts 
 
 First, every energy conflict in the Middle East was preceded by a danger zone, in which the oil companies 
suffered differential decumulation. (The only apparent exception is the 2011 Arab Spring and the 
outsourced wars that followed – though, in 2010, the differential return of the oil companies were pretty 
close to zero.) 
 
 Second, every energy conflict was followed by a period during which the oil companies beat the average. 
 
 And, third, with only one exception, in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed to beat the average 
without an Energy Conflict first taking place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9 Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: The Petro-Core vs. the Fortune 500 
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return on equity is the difference between the 
return on equity of the Petro-Core and of the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on equity of the Fortune 500. 
For 1992-93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special charges. The last data point is for 
2013.  
 
NOTE: The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon 
(ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to 
mergers. Energy Conflicts mark the starting points of: the 1967 Arab-Israel war; the 1973 Arab-Israel war; the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution; the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 Iran-Iraq War; the 1982 second Israeli invasion of Lebanon; 
the 1990-91 first Gulf War; the 2000 second Palestinian Intifada; the 2001 attack of 9/11, the launching of the ‘War on 
Terror’ and the invasion of Afghanistan; the 2002-3 second Gulf War; the 2011 Arab Spring and outsourced wars; the 2014 
third Gulf War.  
 
SOURCE: Fortune; Compustat through WRDS. 
 
(Taken from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, February): 
64 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
Year Energy Conflict 
1967 Israeli-Arab 
1973 Israeli-Arab 
1979 Lebanon / Hostages / Afghanistan 
1980 Iraq-Iran 
1982 2nd Invasion Lebanon 
1990-1 1st Gulf War 
2000 2nd Intifada 
2001 9/11 / Afghanistan 
2002-3 2nd Gulf War 
2011 Arab Spring & outsourced wars 
2014 3rd Gulf War 
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FIGURE 10 Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: Integrated Oil Companies vs. the World 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as three-year trailing averages. Earnings per share (EPS) are calculated by 
dividing the stock price index by the price-earnings ratio. The annual rate of change is measured relative to the 
corresponding month in the previous year. Differential EPS growth is calculated by subtracting the EPS growth rate of the 
world index from the EPS growth rate of the integrated oil index. The last data points are for May 2015. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOTMKWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio 
of all listed firms, respectively; OILINWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed 
integrated oil firms, respectively). 
 
(Updated from Bichler, Shimshon, and Jonathan Nitzan. 2015. Still About Oil? Real-World Economics Review (70, 
February): 66 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/432/).  
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FIGURE 11 U.S. Military Spending as a Share of GDP 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal of World 
Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 16, p. 319 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/1/). Till 1928, data for 
military spending are from Nils Petter Gleditsch, The Peace Dividend (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 1996), and data 
for GDP are from Global Financial Data. From 1929 onward, data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through 
Global Insight (series codes: GDP for GDP; GFML for military spending). 
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FIGURE 12 Shares of Global Market Capitalization 
 
NOTE: Series denote monthly data shown as 12-month moving averages. The last data points are for May 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel (London: Pluto 
Press), Figure 5.9 p. 272 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/8/). Original data are from Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD 
for world total, OILINWD for integrated oil; AERSPWD for defence; TECNOWD for technology). 
 
 
 
Periodicity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period Differential Accumulation Regime Coalition 
1970s – Mid 1980s Depth / frequent energy conflicts Weapon$-Petro$ 
Mid 1980s – 1990s Breadth / infrequent energy conflict Techno$-Merger$ 
2000s Depth / frequent energy conflicts Weapon$-Petro$ 
2010s ?  
